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I

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent.
Case No. 16575

vs.
MARVIN WHITTENBACK and
JOHN JOSEPH PARRETT,

and 16738

Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

I.

THE INITIAL ENCOUNTER BETWEEN APPELLANTS AND
POLICE WAS A SEIZURE AND THEREFORE DESERVING
OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION

The Respondent asserts that the initial encounter
and questioning by the police did not rise to the level
of a seizure and was not therefore worthy of Fourth Amendment protection.

We reiterate that the Supreme Court in

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. l

(1968) expressly reserved the

question of what minimum intrusion is necessary to constitute a seizure.
We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of an investigative "~eizure" upon
less than probable cause for purposes of "detention"
and/or interrogation. Obviously, not all personal
intercourse between policemen and citizens involves
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"seizures" of persons.
Only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show or authority, has
in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen
may we conclude that a seizure has occurred.
392
U.S. 1, 19, n. 16.
To say that the conduct of the three officers invalved was not sufficient show of authority to in some
way restrain the liberty of the Appellants is to ignore
the dynamics of the situation.

This is not the case of

a pedestrian policeman stopping a bypasser for identification.
mat.

The Appellants were the only ones in the laundro-

The police action was directed exclusively at them.

The entrance of Officer Geslison was followed almost immediately by the arrival of two more cars with two more
officers--a total of three patrolmen arriving separately
within two minutes.

(R.159: 19; 168: 19-20; 182: 17)

That would seem to be a considerably greater show of
authority than is ordinarily necessary to check I.D.

To

say that in such a situation one would feel himself free
to either go or stay as he pleased
II.

i~

to ignore reality.

REQUIRING APPELLANTS TO EMPTY THEIR POCKETS
IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER TERRY AND WAS NOT A
SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST

The Respondent contends that the search of the
Appellants' persons in the laundromat by Officer Geslison
was incident to a lawful arrest and therefore justified.
Respondent's assertion that Appellant Whittenback had
been arrested by Officer Mock prior to his being searched
is based on a selective reading of the record and not

-2-
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supported by the weight of the testimony.
The Respondent relies on Officer Geslison's testimony
at the suppression hearing.

Geslison testified that though

the order to "empty your pockets" had been given previous to
Officer Mack's entrance, Appellant Whittenback had not
actually begun to do so until after Mack's announcement that
they were under arrest.

(R. 149)

At the preliminary hearing,

however, Officer Geslison testified:

Q

(Mr. Schumacher):

I understood that.

You said

that after all of these items had been collected,
then Officer Mock arrested him.
A

(Officer Geslison):

Okay.

What I had stated, Mr.

Parrett had already emptied his pockets previous
to that.

As I asked Mr. Whittenback about that same

time as I was moving over to the table, etc., etc.
at about the same time that Officer Mock came in.
He could have started to empty his pockets just
before that, but like I just told you, I--he had
questioned me and I told him to empty his pockets.
Officer Mock, who presumably would be in a better position to recall the exact sequence of his entrance and Appellant
Whittenback's emptying his pockets, testified that Whittenback
was in the process of carrying out the order when he came in:

Q

(Mr. Schumacher):

Did you hear Officer Geslison tell

him to empty his pockets?
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A (Officer Mock):

No, I did not.

Q Was he emptying his pockets as you came in?

A Yes.

(R. 185)

The Terrz case as well as subsequent decisions made
it clear that any search conducted as a part of a Terry
stop must be limited to a procedure reasonably designed
to discover weapons of assault.
A search for weapons in the absence of probable
cause to arrest, however, must, like any other
search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.
[citation]
Thus it must be limited to that which is necessary
for the discovery of weapons which might be used to
harm the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a "full"
search, even though it remains a serious intrusion.
392 u.s. at 25-26
The officers here never suggested that the Appellants were
carrying weapons.

Nor was there anything in the conduct

of the Appellants that would give rise to apprehension as
to their own safety or the safety of others.

What's more,

the general order to "empty your pockets" is hardly the sort
of "strictly circumscribed" measure the Court intended to

all~.

The case of Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968),
decided the same day as Terry, considered many of the same
issues presented in the present case.

In Sibron, a uniformed

police officer had been keeping the defendant under continual
observation over a period of eight hours.

During that eight

hour period the officer saw the defendant converse with six
or eight persons whom he (the officer) knew from past experience to be narcotics addicts.

The defendant then entered
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a restaurant where he spoke with three more known addicts.
The patrolman entered the restaurant and told the defendant
to come outside.

Once outside, the officer said to Sibron,

"You know what I am after."

The defendant mumbled something

and reached into his pocket whereupon the officer thrust
his hand into the same pocket discovering several glassine
envelopes of heroin.

The Court said that the action taken

by the police was illegal under the Fourth Amendment and
reversed the conviction.
In the case of the self-protective search for weapons,
he [the officer) must be able to point to particular
facts from which he reasonably inferred that the
individual was armed and dangerous .... 392 at 64.
Even assuming arguendo that there were adequate grounds
to search Sibron for weapons, the nature and scope of
the search conducted by Patrolman Martin was so clearly unrelated to that justification as to render the
heroin inadmissible. The search for weapons approved
in Terry consisted solely of patting the outer clothing of the suspect for concealed objects which might
be used as instruments of assault.
392 at 65.
The search of the Appellants' persons was made prior
to the time they were placed under arrest.

There was no

authorization for the search under Terry since there was
no indication the Appellants were armed.

In any case, the

order to "empty your pockets" was beyond the scope of anything envisioned by Terry.
The Respondent now asserts that there was probable
cause for the arrest before the search was begun.

A finding

of probable cause would have to be based on the observation
of the two doing laundry late at night in an all-night
laundromat that was open for business; that one of them
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had bulging pockets and that two keys were lying on the
floor; no machines appeared broken into; no alarms had
sounded; no report had been made to police of machines
being entered.

All that appeared to the officers were

persons suspected (not convicted) in the past of machine
break-ins.

Appellant contends that such a scanty combi-

nation of facts does not meet the necessary minimum of
probable cause.
III.

THE SEARCH OF THE AUTOMOBILE WAS A VIOLATION
OF APPELLANTS' FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS

The Respondent next contends that Appellant did not have
standing under Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) to
challenge the search of the automobile.

In Rakas, a

petitioner who was merely riding as a passenger in a car
owned by another and claimed no interest in either the search·
ed auto or the property seized was held to have no standing
to make a Fourth Amendment challenge.

The Court rejected

the petitioner's suggestion that any time a search is
directed at a particular individual he has standing to challenge its legality.

Instead the Court said the inquiry

should focus on the substantive question of whether there
has been a violation of the individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy.
The Appellants clearly had standing under

pre-~

rules in that they claimed an interest in the goods seized.
Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.S. 389 (1968).

The holding in~

does not alter that result.
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The facts in the present case are similar to the case
of Jones v. U.S. ,362 U.S. 257 (1960) which the Court in
Rakas expressly reaffirmed.

In Jones the defendant was at

the time of the search the temporary but sole occupant of
an apartment owned by a friend.

The Court in Rakas said

that the status gave him a reasonable expectation of
privacy as to the apartment.

Here the Appellants had

temporary but exclusive use of an automobile owned by
another.

By contrast, the defendants in Rakas were merely

passengers in the car driven by the owner.

The Court

seemed to indicate that even they would have had standinng
had they claimed an interest in the property seized.
U.S. at 142 n. 11.

439

It seems clear that the Appellants had

a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the car.
Respondents argument, if carried not much further,
would give a lessor of a car no standing to challenge the
search of his property in that car owned by another.
The Respondent argues that it was not necessary for
the police to secure a warrant to search the car because
of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
The Supreme Court cases of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 43
(1970) and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)
make it clear that what is commonly denominated the automobile exception is simply an example of an exigent circumstance that makes the securing of a warrant impracticable.
The Court said in Coolidge, quoting in part from Chambers,
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that "exigent circumstances justify the warrantless search
of 'an automobile stopped on the hiohway, where there is
probable cause, because the car is movable, the occupants
are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found
again if a warrant must be obtained.'

... The word 'auto-

mobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
Amendment disappears."

[Emphasis original]

Federal Appeals Courts' decisions make clear the
necessity of exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search of an automobile.

In the case of Harless v.

Turner, 456 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1972) the Court held the
warrantless search of a parked rape suspect's car invalid.
Coolidge makes it clear that the warrantless search
is the exception rather than the rule and that
these exceptions are jealously guarded. Furthermore, it is said in Coolidge that the burden is on
those seeking exemption to show the need for it.
465 F.2d 1338.
One situation the Courts have frequently recognized
as not constituting an exigency that would allow the police
to dispense with the securing of a warrant is the situation
where the driver of the searched car is under arrest.
U.S. v. McCormick 502 F.2d 281

In

(9th Cir. 1974) the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals said in a case similar to this one,
Six officers entered the house to arrest McCormick,
and he was quickly handcuffed.
Moreover, even if
he could have gained access to his car, he could
not have driven it away, because a police car was
blocking the driveway.
In Carroll and Coolidge
terms, this automobile more resembled a house tnan
a moving or mobile vehicle.
Becau~e there were no
exigent circumstances at the time of the seizure, the
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later search cannot be justified under Chambers v.
Maroney. "No amount of probable cause can justify
a warrantless search or seizure absent 'exigent
circumstances,'" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. at 468, 91 S.Ct. at 2039, and so the seizure
here does not fall within the automobile exception
to the warrant requirement.
502 F.2d at 287.
Likewise with the present case.

The second sine qua non

of the automobile exception was lacking; i.e. there were
no exigent circumstances.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

L~~~~~~Attorney for Appellant
John Joseph Parrett
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copies

of the foregoing Appellants' Reply Brief to the Utah
Attorney General, Robert B. Hansen, at 236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

30

v-8-/

day of July, 1980.

-10-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,

